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So kann ich nicht sagen, was ich nur meine. 
         —Hegel, Science of Logic  
   
             For the good that I would I do not: but the evil which I would not, that I do. 
         —Romans 7:19 
 
 Paul de Man proposes that of all literary modalities it is allegory that best illuminates 
the temporal nature of existence—and of thought and action in particular. Allegory as de Man 
understands it also sheds light on disjunction, on separation and finitude, as a constitutive 
moment or condition for history, politics, and all creative activity. If allegory discloses what de 
Man calls the “authentically temporal destiny” of existence, it also ruins the humanistic 
assumptions through which terms such as “existence,” “memory,” “language,” and even “the 
human” are understood in the modern philosophical tradition. Allegory brings to light an in-
human dimension in what we call language, and this is a register that cannot be ignored when it 
comes to thinking about history, art, or politics.  
 I begin by discussing several of the key points about allegory and time raised by de Man 
in essays published from the mid-1970s through the early 1980s. I then turn to the Salvadoran 
writer Horacio Castellanos Moya’s 2013 novel El sueño del retorno, situated in the early 1990s 
and whose protagonist—not unlike the author himself at the time—resides in Mexico and 
dreams of returning to San Salvador in the wake of the 1993 Chapultepec Peace Accords that 
nominally put an end to the decades-long Salvadoran civil war. I consider Castellanos Moya’s 
novel in the context of Fredric Jameson’s notion of national allegory and propose that the 
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questions concerning temporality and technics brought forth in de Man’s work can help us to 
see how El sueño del retorno problematizes some of the underlying assumptions of Jameson’s 
text.  
 We misunderstand the nature of allegory, de Man contends, if we think of it as a sign 
pointing to a referent—typically an abstract idea—existing outside of language. The referent to 
which the allegorical sign points is nothing other than another sign. But it is not just any sign; it 
is a special sign posited as having existed in an irretrievable past.1 Allegory, as de Man puts it in 
Heideggerian language, thus partakes in the “unveiling of an authentically temporal destiny” 
(de Man 1983, 206). He continues by proposing that allegorical reference be understood as a 
specific kind of repetition, one that he associates with the name of Kierkegaard:  
This relation between signs necessarily contains a constitutive temporal element; it 
remains necessary, if there is to be allegory, that the allegorical sign refer to another 
sign that precedes it. The meaning constituted by the allegorical sign can then consist 
only in the repetition (in the Kierkegaardian sense of the term) of a previous sign with 
which it can never coincide, since it is the essence of the previous sign to be pure 
anteriority….Allegory designates primarily a distance in relation to its own origin, and, 
renouncing the nostalgia and desire to coincide, it establishes its language in the void of 
this temporal difference. (de Man 1983, 207)  
In this account, allegorical disclosure of temporal destiny bears something akin to a tragic tone, 
marking both a debt and a non-negatable distance with respect to its own origin, an originary 
separation as the condition of possibility for allegorical remembrance. Allegorical reflection on 
the origin unfolds in view of a subject who precisely seeks refuge from fleetingness and 
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mortality—in other words, from time itself—in a natural realm. However, allegory also 
discovers that its subject is constitutively barred from this natural world in which it would seek 
refuge, a world in relation to which the subject “bears no resemblance.” This is separation 
disclosing itself as the secret origin of allegorical narrative. It is because the allegorical subject 
exists in time and in the domain of artifice or technics that it is barred from the purity of this 
anterior sphere in which it seeks refuge.  
 The point can be clarified by contrasting allegory to the symbol, the nature of which is 
atemporal. With the symbol, appearance and being, manifestation and idea, belong to the 
same totality, differing only in extension. The components that make up the symbol exist 
contemporaneously with one another, and their relationship is thus not temporal but spatial. In 
contrast to the atemporal unity of the symbol, time and heterogeneity are the constitutive 
elements for allegory. Not only does allegory introduce temporal distance in relation to its own 
origin, it establishes its language in what de Man terms “the void of [a] temporal difference.” In 
other words, allegorical separation constitutes a difference whose elements cannot be 
reconciled with one another because they are neither contemporaneous nor even part of a 
single chronological sequence. For allegory, present and archaic past prove to be something 
other than two points on the same (temporal) line. The anteriority to which allegory points was 
never present to begin with. Although de Man does not put things in quite this way, it seems to 
me that this thought of dissymmetry calls attention to a dimension within time that is not 
temporal in nature, a part of time that cannot properly speaking be temporalized. This is one of 
the conclusions of de Man’s investigation; but allegory as literary form always begins with the 
semblance of a linear chronological relationship that could be repeated in reverse.  
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 As for the reference to repetition “in the Kierkegaardian sense,” although de Man does 
not explain what he has in mind, Kierkegaard’s Repetition essay offers some useful hints. The 
essay opposes its notion of repetition to two hallowed philosophical principles. The first is the 
Platonic concept of anamnesis as originary memory, an ontological premise that absolutizes 
being as what has been and thereby excludes any possibility of thinking truth as the new or as 
breaking with the past. The other principle is the Hegelian account of the dialectic as a 
mediation process capable of subsuming all difference under the logic of the same. Formally 
speaking, repetition and recollection are the same for Kierkegaard. Their vectors, however, are 
precisely inverted: “what is recollected has already been and is thus repeated backward, 
whereas genuine repetition is recollected forwards” (Kierkegaard 2009, 3). The meaning of this 
distinction between “backwards” and “forwards” trajectories is illustrated when Kierkegaard’s 
character Constantin sets out to visit Berlin, a city he visited long ago and where he now hopes 
to relive old memories. But reliving the past (“repetition backwards”) proves to be impossible, 
because the postulated return necessarily forecloses the dimensions of chance and surprise 
that colored the first time. Memory and calculation precisely get in the way of the recovery 
they seek to bring about. But before we conclude that the distinction amounts to nothing more 
than a simple linear chronology of first time versus subsequent reiterations that may or may 
not be able to capture the essence of the first time, let us note that in this example the “first 
time” only becomes what it is through repetition, which determines it as the sign of a pure and 
irretrievable anteriority. What Kierkegaard calls “genuine” repetition (“recollection forwards”), 
in contradistinction to Platonic anamnesis and Hegelian reconciliation, is anything but linear 
and sequential. This distinction sheds important light on what de Man is up to in his discussion 
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of allegory. Repetition introduces a distance and a dissymmetry through which what is 
repeated, the “first time,” takes shape not as an ideal referent but as an anterior sign capable 
of temporalizing experience. 
 Arne Melberg emphasizes that Kierkegaardian repetition thematizes a break in 
sequentialized chronologizations of time (Melberg 1990). The “Now” of repetition, as we just 
saw in the Constantin example, is also an “after,” a second time that refers to a “then,” which is 
the sign of a prior time. By the same token, the “then” (what will have been the first time) of 
repetition bears the trace of the “after,” because irretrievable anteriority only emerges in and 
through repetition, or more precisely through the inability to return. Anteriority as origin is an 
effect of what comes after. The deictic chaining of “now,” “then,” and “after” sustains a non-
linear circuit of reference that threatens to unravel the sequential structure of narrative time. 
Repetition, like deixis, is language referring to itself. It short circuits the temporal ordering of 
before and after through introduction of the now. The “Now” of repetition has no proper place 
of its own in any temporal sequence, because in a certain sense it has always already happened 
while in another sense it unavoidably comes too late. Repetition, in its “Kierkegaardian sense,” 
thereby opens a site from which the new might be thought and experienced. But it is also a kind 
of resistance within language; it exposes a disjunction or coming apart that makes it difficult for 
us to be confident that we know of what we are speaking when we refer to “language.”  
 The peculiar movement of temporalization that is proper to allegory can be detected 
in one of the classic gesture of the 20th century Latin American novel: literary returns to a 
primordial time or place that has been construed as the lost, buried, or forgotten origin of Latin 
American consciousness. Such literary returns often come charged with hopes of escaping the 
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ill effects of modernization for a form of life presumed to be more natural, authentic, and 
harmonious. What is typically uncovered or disclosed, however, is not a phenomenal reality but 
another sign or trope: the encrypted manuscript in García Márquez’s Cien años de soledad; 
baroque nature as writing in Carpentier’s Los pasos perdidos; primitive accumulation as theft 
and reinscription in Rulfo’s Pedro Páramo; and so on.  
 I now turn to Fredric Jameson’s much-discussed claim about national allegory in his 
1986 essay “Third-World Literature in the Era of Multinational Capitalism,” which I look at in 
the context of de Man’s discussion of temporalization. The controversial claim that all Third-
World novels can be read as national allegories is grounded in Jameson’s assessment that the 
divide between public and private spheres that goes without question in the developed world 
does not prevail in the same way in Latin America and other underdeveloped regions. First and 
Third worlds face each other as mirror images. First-World cultural production is over-coded by 
a bourgeois hegemony that has succeeded in establishing its own ideas and sensibility as a 
general truth that goes without saying. From that point on, collective spaces and struggles can 
only be grasped from the perspective of the modern individual: as its playground or as a jungle 
in which its security is threatened. For Third-World literature, meanwhile, the private/public 
distinction is neither clear-cut nor does it appear as a truth/falsehood dichotomy. Narratives of 
ostensibly private, interior experiences continue to offer insight into the shared struggles of the 
oppressed. Juan Preciado’s return to Comala in search of paternal recognition and/or redress 
for the ordeals suffered by his mother turns into a poetic account of an historical wound and a 
deep-seated structure of domination and inequality that Mexico will need to come to terms 
with in order for the emancipatory promise of the revolution to be fulfilled. Third-World 
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literature not only affords greater awareness of ideological formations, according to Jameson it 
also retains memory traces of alternatives to the historical temporality of capitalism. The 
fragmented and scattered murmurs to which Preciado bears witness in Comala, to continue 
with the example, contain memory traces that attest to a shared right of rebellion against 
tyranny. Against the individuation, fragmentation, and alienation that prevail in developed 
societies, national allegory opposes “the principles of community interdependence” (Jameson 
1986, 86) as what de Man would call the sign of anteriority. But for Jameson, writing in 1986, 
this anterior sign was clearly not meant to be seen as irretrievable.  
 Jameson patterns the formal inversion of First and Third World allegorical codes after 
the structure of Hegel’s master/slave dialectic. While much could be said about the relationship 
between allegory and consciousness, this is not the place to enter into a detailed discussion of 
Hegel’s Phenomenology except to reference a recent critique of Jameson’s position in a paper 
by Alberto Moreiras on cynicism in the work of Castellanos Moya (Moreiras 2014). While 
Moreiras advances reservations about Jameson’s reading of the status of “situational 
consciousness” in Hegel’s account of how the slave begins to acquire consciousness through 
experiences of negativity, my own concern has to do with the under-theorized status of 
allegory in Jameson’s essay. The problem I am raising is not, as many readers have alleged, that 
Jameson overlooks the likely possibility that there are some (or many) non-allegorical texts out 
there. On the contrary, I believe that close attention to de Man’s work would similarly lead us 
to the conclusion that there is indeed no escaping the allegorical framework, and that even 
Jameson’s most vehement critics would have a difficult time freeing themselves completely 
from the allegorical model.2 The more interesting blind spot in Jameson’s claim, it seems to me, 
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is that it is made in the absence of any sustained reflection on what is at stake in the allegorical 
structure of temporalization. Jameson’s thesis bears a clear debt to Hegel, but it is not 
accompanied by any reflection on what sort of interest payments might come attached to such 
a loan. Jameson presumes that allegory can provide access to an anti-capitalist memory or 
imaginary, and that it can do so even in the dark times of late modernity. However, his 
assertions about situational consciousness and epistemic privilege turn out to depend on the 
very things they seem so eager to free themselves from: the tropological language of literature 
and what de Man calls the narrativization of history as ideology. Moreover, if we accept 
Jameson’s universalization of the allegorical structure of literature, which I am proposing we 
do, it is difficult to see how this universalization could offer the critical awareness that he 
seeks—both because the subjective support provided by allegory is imaginary in nature and 
because allegory’s temporalizing structure may be indistinguishable from the developmentalist 
teleology of capitalist modernity. If allegory provides the basic template for modern 
conceptualizations of history—a point I will now discuss—then it is not easy to envision how 
allegory could provide access to a sensibility or a way of life that is decisively other than 
capitalist modernity.  
 One of the key texts in de Man’s consideration of allegorical language is the 
posthumously-published essay “Sign and Symbol in Hegel’s Aesthetics” (de Man 1996), which 
takes stock of the curious place allotted to allegory in Hegel’s discussions of art, philosophy and 
history. It is there that de Man proposes that all modern conceptualizations of history are 
allegorical through and through. Hegelian thought, he observes, is at one and the same time a 
history of philosophy and a philosophy of history. Hegel’s system is a reckoning with the 
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reciprocal determination of thought and history by way of a poetics of allegory in which 
contingency and freedom are woven together. If philosophical inquiry is dependent on allegory, 
by implication the various ways of understanding history that we inherit from modern 
philosophy are also informed by allegory, and in a manner that may prove equally difficult to 
grasp or to denounce and leave behind once and for all.  Finally, de Man demonstrates that it is 
also allegory that provides insight into how the Hegelian system remains unable to complete 
itself as such, remaining dependent on a difference that it cannot subsume as a difference of 
the system.  
 The mechanisms of allegorical narrativization are not those of a conscious, willful 
subject. Allegorical language seems to follow its own course, less like the expression of a self-
conscious subject and more like an automated or ghostly machine. It provides evidence of a 
technics at the heart of what we ordinarily think of as the sovereign domain of the human 
subject: interiority, memory, expression. By the same token allegory stages the occurrence of 
language as it exceeds the concepts and models we have at our disposal for understanding 
language itself: as rhetoric, cognition, performative, and so on. Allegory is language becoming 
different from itself, and hence slipping away from of our cognitive grasp. 
 Although the discussion of allegory in Hegel’s lectures on aesthetics is relegated to a 
marginal place, de Man demonstrates how this peripheral site provides foundational support 
for the Hegelian system while also threatening to undermine its structural stability from within. 
Allegory is the name for a constitutive limit on which the Hegelian system depends, although it 
remains unable to master it or fully bring it within its domain. De Man terms it the “defective 
cornerstone” of the speculative architectonic. If allegory is the weak point that threatens to 
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bring the entire edifice crashing down,  it is also as the jointure that allows the structure to 
stand in the first place, the conduit between exterior and interior, sensible and supersensible 
realms.   
The commanding metaphor that organizes [the Hegelian] system is that of 
interiorization, the understanding of aesthetic beauty as the external manifestation of 
an ideal content which is itself an interiorized experience, the recollected emotion of a 
bygone perception. The sensory manifestation (sinnliches Scheinen) of art and literature 
is the outside of an inner content which is itself an outer event or entity that has been 
internalized. (de Man 1996, 100) 
 Although few of his readers would consider Hegel a thinker inclined to put much 
philosophical weight on art, the stakes when it comes to aesthetics and allegory are indeed 
high. Hegel understands aesthetic activity in general as the sensible appearance or 
manifestation of the idea. Artistic creativity serves as a bridge between the phenomenal realm 
of the senses and the supersensible domain of the intellect. In the absence of such a conduit to 
the phenomenal world, the intellect would find itself condemned to the realm of abstraction. 
As a particular mode of aesthetic activity, meanwhile, allegory enjoys a privileged role in this 
mediation. Recall that many of Hegel’s predecessors denigrated allegory as bereft of the innate 
aesthetic value of the symbol. Whereas the symbol was celebrated as displaying a unified, 
natural connection between form and content, allegory was seen as an artificial and 
conventional mode of signification that relies on signs rather than natural correspondences. 
Philosophy and aesthetic theory have tended to disparage it, equating its contingent 
arrangement of sensible and supersensible elements with ugliness. While Hegel accepts the 
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formal terms of the distinction he turns the tables on the tradition by asserting that it is 
precisely in this contingency of the sign that the intellect can assert its freedom from 
determination by the sensible world. If correspondence between phenomenal appearance and 
idea is conventional in allegory then, by implication, it is only through allegory that the intellect 
can assert its own sovereignty over the specific form it assumes. 
 In the above-quoted passage we also catch glimpse of an important disjunction that 
emerges in the allegorical relation. Unlike what happens with the symbol, the interior content 
to which allegory gives form is not an ideal meaning residing outside of time. The interior state 
that it discloses turns out to be the product of an earlier interiorization: for instance, an 
occurrence whose experience inscribed itself in the memory circuits of the subject. Thus the 
interior, non-sensible “origin” that allegory is charged with transporting into the sensible realm 
is in fact the product of a prior translation (external to internal). This translational loop, in 
which exteriorization is always already interiorization, effectively splits allegorical language 
from itself, overdetermining the sign as a sedimentary artifact possessing multiple temporal 
“layers.”  
 The paradigm for art is thought and not perception, allegorical sign and not the natural 
unity of the symbol, writing and not painting or music. For the same reason, de Man points out, 
art for Hegel is also linked to memorization (Gedächtnis) and not recollection (Erinnerung). 
Memorization denotes the exteriorization of internalized memory in the written sign, as 
opposed to the ideal internal process that is recollection. As we have seen, allegory partakes in 
a past whose recovery is out of the question. The object of memorization is of the past in a 
radical sense, and allegory “leaves the interiorization of experience forever behind. It is of the 
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past to the extent that it materially inscribes, and thus forever forgets, its ideal content” (de 
Man 1996, 103). The result is a conundrum whereby the allegorical manifestation of interiority 
through memorization effectively negates what it ought to preserve—not unlike the way in 
which Plato accuses writing, which is supposed to serve as an aide memoire, of in fact 
promoting forgetting.  Memorization introduces a mechanicity that Hegel describes as an 
“empty link” [das leere Band] between interior experience and the phenomenal world. Once 
incarnated in the written word, memory can no longer be understood as the ideal unification of 
the subject with itself: past with present, passive with active, reflected with reflecting.  
 I now turn to an essay that de Man first published in Critical Inquiry in 1976 under the 
title “Political Allegory in Rousseau.” That article was reprinted three years later, with a few 
alterations, in Allegories of Reading under the heading “Promises (Social Contract).” The 
question I want to look at before moving on to Castellanos Moya involves the difference 
between those two titles. The substitution invites us to ask what happens when the promise 
and its temporality comes to take the place of political allegory. Are these two names for the 
same thing? Or, after further reflection, did de Man decide to replace an inadequate term with 
a more precise one?  
 One answer to this question can be found in de Man’s account of reading as 
confrontation with the aporetic nature of text. A text, he tells us, demands to be read 
simultaneously through heterogeneous locutionary registers: for instance, as figurative 
language and grammatical order, as constative and performative speech, and so on. The 
passage from one register to another, however, introduces a difference that cannot be 
reconciled by recourse to the tools proper to one register or the other. The passage itself has 
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no proper measure. As is the case with language, what we call text is therefore irreducibly 
heterogeneous, not One. Text necessitates a thinking of any present as always-already differing 
from itself. It threatens the ideal unity and homogeneity of time that serves as the foundation 
for philosophical, political and economic modernity. With de Man’s essay I propose that the 
two titles in question inform one another in the following way: the promise clarifies what is at 
stake in political allegory (a strange temporality without which there could be no politics) while 
political allegory situates the odd temporality of the promise in the realm of power and 
decision. At the same time, the passage from political allegory to promise also marks a limit for 
the political. The demonstration of this point will have to wait until the final part of this essay. 
 De Man’s elucidation of this disjunction internal language finds its political corollary in 
Rousseau’s view of the modern State in its “static” and “active” roles. What we call the State 
coincides with distinct functions and responsibilities that may not be reconcilable under a single 
concept. On one hand the State designates a constituted entity (Etat) charged with legislating 
and applying the law. But it also points to a constitutive sovereign force (Souverain) whose 
nature is to assign itself the law, and which is necessary in principle if we hope to distinguish 
between legitimate and illegitimate uses of power and force. In de Man’s terms this is 
analogous to the distinction between constative (Etat) and performative (Souverain) modalities 
of language, or between grammar and rhetoric, or between cognition and action. A text, such 
as a constitution or a treatise on political theory, must take into account both of these 
modalities, and regardless of the possibility that they may prove to be incompatible with one 
another. “It seems,” writes de Man, “that as soon as a text knows what it states, it can only act 
deceptively, like the thieving lawmaker in the Social Contract, and if a text does not act, it 
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cannot state what it knows” (de Man 1979, 270).  Cognition and action, Etat and Souverain, 
must be brought together in order for there to be politics at all, i.e., something more than 
arbitrary, self-interested deployment of power and expropriation. In bringing these modalities 
together, however, the text produces a situation in which the terms of one must be subjugated 
to those of the other. The disjunction that splits cognition and action is not a shortcoming that 
Rousseau could have fixed, just as he could not resolved the difference between constative and 
performative speech. It is, as de Man writes in the 1979 version of the essay,  
a fact of language over which Rousseau himself has no control. Just as any other reader, 
he is bound to misread his text as a promise of political change. The error is not with the 
reader; language itself dissociates the cognition from the act. Die Sprache verspricht 
(sich); to the extent that it is necessarily misleading, language just as necessarily conveys 
the promise of its own truth. (277)   
 In the 1976 version of the essay de Man had written “Die Sprache verspricht”: language 
promises. In the 1979 revised version he changes this to: Die Sprache verspricht (sich). Both 
variations allude to Heidegger’s Die Sprache spricht: language speaks. The difference between 
de Man’s formulations and Heidegger’s is marked only by the elusive verbal prefix ver-, which 
introduces an implicit distinction between an act that inaugurates a totality (language speaking, 
which in Heidegger’s formulation is tantamount to saying “the world worlds” or “being 
discloses”) and an act that introduces a gap between the time of speech and the time in which 
what is spoken will have been realized (language promising). The promise is divided from itself; 
its structure gives shape to a thought of time as heterogeneous and irreducible to any 
metaphysical conceptualization of time, i.e., to any inquiry that would determine the essence of 
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time as presence.3 Every promise, every utterance of an action still to be realized in the form of 
an “I will do…,” finds itself divided between distinct times: the present moment of speaking; a 
past whose reality the promise vows will change; and a (specified or indeterminate) future 
present in which the promise will be fulfilled. This is the case whether the promise appeals to 
the speaker’s personal life (“I vow to quit smoking after exams are over”) or to history (“The 
communist revolution will put an end to class conflict and exploitation”). Language promises, 
and it is in language that the promissory structure of the political is to be found. One of the 
things Rousseau teaches us is that there can be no politics without language and without the 
odd temporality of the promise. In the absence of this differential temporality and the 
potentiality it harbors, politics would be indistinguishable from mere administration of social 
differences and calculative expropriation of time.  
  In the 1979 version of the essay de Man revises the 1976 sentence through the insertion 
of the reflexive pronoun, generating a new and somewhat idiosyncratic sentence: Die Sprache 
verspricht (sich). Transitively or intransitively, language promises [verspricht]; reflexively, 
language misspeaks or stumbles over itself [sich verspricht]. Language introduces disjuncture 
and thereby ruins the identity between form and meaning, phenomenality and truth. We must 
not move too hastily in dismissing this focus on language and its aporias as a sophistic evasion 
of the real—i.e., practical—concerns of politics. As Jacques Derrida puts it in an essay written 
shortly after de Man’s death, it is precisely the aporetic structure of the promise that “gives or 
promises the thinking of the very possibility of what still remains unthinkable or unthought, 
indeed, impossible” (Derrida 1989a, 132). The structure of the promise is not that of a simple 
lag time separating the moment of pronunciation from the time of action and/or fulfillment of 
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whatever terms are set out in the promise. At an equally fundamental level the promise 
underscores a dimension of incalculability that underlies all speech and all action insofar as they 
presuppose the possibility of being read, heard and understood again in the future. Although 
the promise unquestionably involves a calculative appropriation of time insofar as it projects a 
determinate future that the speaker vows to help bring about, the very utterance of the 
promise also underscores a limit for all calculation: after all, if time could be fully subsumed 
within calculative reason then there would be no need to make promises in the first place.  
 Derrida too focuses on the promise as highlighting a dimension of allegorical language 
that exceeds calculation, albeit from within calculation itself. He calls this dimension a Faktum. 
The structure of facticity resembles the irretrievable anteriority that de Man associates with the 
allegorical referent:  
[it is] a fact of language…over which we have no control. This “fact” is not natural, it is 
an artifact, but an artifact which for us…is already there, as a past which has never been 
present. We might say that it is historicity itself—a historicity which cannot be historical, 
an “ancientness” without history, without anteriority, but which produces history. 
(Derrida 1989, 95) 
 Here the dichotomy of speech and act, saying and doing, begins to tremble. Linguistic 
facticity is not of nature but of technics, a technics that is at work in all creative activity (art, 
literature, politics). This Faktum has no history, and thus it can only be represented 
allegorically. Or it can only be represented allegorically and catachrestically, i.e., as irretrievable 
anteriority. But this facticity is also the condition of possibility for anything like history, and thus 
silently at work in any allegory. As past that has never been present, it is the originary cut that 
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will have severed all speaking beings from nature, a separation through which it becomes 
possible to conceive of “nature” and “culture.” Such a cut is not an origin in any essential sense; 
in other words, it could never have constituted an origin in its own time (if it had a time). It can 
only become origin a posteriori, once irretrievably lost, in the speech that drowns out the 
silence of the cut. This retroactive temporal structuring of facticity as temporal precisely inverts 
the promissory structure of which I have been speaking.  Thus the promise brings to light the 
radical anteriority of “language” or linguistic facticity that turns out to possess the same odd 
temporal structure that governs allegory.   
 De Man’s discussion of allegorical anteriority, of a past that was never present, opens up 
possibilities for thinking time and history as something other than a progressive or 
teleologically guided sequence. Recall that for de Man a text demands to be read at one and 
the same time as describing and constituting what it describes. As we have seen, this “one and 
the same time” is anything but a single, homogeneous time. Like the radical anteriority 
described by Derrida, it has never been present and could not become present, and yet there 
could be no such thing as action or politics without it. It may be that allegorical anamnesis of an 
anteriority that was never present offers a site for thinking the non-oppositional difference that 
philosophy seems destined to avoid whenever it tries to conceptualize space or time—a site for 
thinking the spacing of time or the becoming time of space. 
 Horacio Castellanos Moya’s 2013 novel El sueño del retorno tells the story of a 
Salvadoran exile, Erasmo Aragón, who is employed as a journalist in Mexico City where he lives 
with his girlfriend and young daughter. In 1991, with UN-brokered negotiations for a cease-fire 
between the FMLN and the Salvadoran army underway, Aragón begins planning his return to 
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San Salvador. There he hopes to “participate in History” (Castellanos Moya 2013, 131), as he 
puts it, by collaborating in a new cultural journal intended to foster the development of a 
democratic culture in his war-torn country. The novel, based loosely on aspects of the author’s 
own experiences during that period, engages in an interesting way with the idea of national 
allegory. In one sense El sueño del retorno is a perfect fit with Jameson’s position: there is no 
personal and familial anecdote in this novel that could not easily be mapped onto the national 
history of El Salvador, no conflict that cannot be understood as echo or symptom of the history 
of oppression, exploitation, and violence in the region. In another sense, however, Castellanos 
Moya’s work precisely moves against Jameson’s account of national allegory: by questioning 
the Hegelian understanding of consciousness as truth of history and, by extension, refusing the 
idea of literature as a mirror in which memories of collective struggle against oppression can 
give birth to a new revolutionary consciousness. 
 El sueño del retorno can also be read productively alongside an earlier collection of 
essays published by Castellanos Moya’s at the time of his own return to El Salvador in the early 
1990s. Entitled Recuento de incertidumbres: cultura y transición en El Salvador, the essays took 
stock of the uncertainties, fears, and hopes that accompanied the end of civil war. Sueño del 
retorno, meanwhile, revisits and rewrites the scene of return two decades later in order to 
narrativize its various desencuentros, its missed opportunities and disappointments. The 
Recuento essays similarly bear the mark of return: of a return to El Salvador that would coincide 
with the country’s rise from the ashes of self-destruction to reinsert itself onto the historical 
tracks of social transformation and progress. Writing in 1993, Castellanos Moya clearly foresaw 
the difficulties that El Salvador would face in its struggle not only with the destruction wrought 
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by civil war but also with a deeply engrained history of ideological polarization in which 
dissensus and difference are seen—by the Left as much as by the Right and the military 
regimes—as a pretext for the other’s annihilation.  
 Primera plana was the name of the journal that Castellanos Moya helped found and 
direct after his return to El Salvador in 1994. The journal promoted dialogue and debate as civil, 
democratic alternatives to that culture of enmity and destruction. Primera plana would oppose 
terror and annihilation with a space for thinking and exchange—a space which, while not itself 
political in any sense, is no doubt an indispensable condition for any desirable politics. The 
journal was short-lived, however, in large part because the editors were unable to secure 
sufficient financial support in the post-war environment. As Castellanos Moya would later 
observe, the journal’s lack of longevity was symptomatic of how the so-called transition proved 
unable to transform old structures, outlooks, and habits that had prevailed in Salvadoran 
society over much of the previous century (Castellanos Moya 2008).  
 One of the incisive points raised in Recuento de incertidumbres concerns what 
Castellanos Moya saw then as the singular status of Central America, in distinction not only 
from the developed world but from other regions in Latin America. Periphery of the periphery 
and isthmus between two oceans, Central America is not only more exposed than most other 
regions to the whims of nature and to the sway of the world’s imperial powers, it is also marked 
by seemingly endless string of massacres, uprooting and migration. As a geopolitical space it is 
forever undergoing displacement and disjunction, its human inhabitants and natural resources 
spilling relentlessly beyond its borders. Alongside the optimistic culturalism that informs 
Castellanos Moya’s plans for his return to El Salvador, Recuento also harbors deep-seated 
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misgivings about what he describes as a “militarism” underlying Salvadoran history. The roots 
of this violence can be traced back to the colonial period, he says, making it in a certain sense 
foundational for post-independent Central American societies. This violence would almost have 
to be understood as non-historical. It precedes distinctions between war and politics, disorder 
and order. It names a thought of strife at the very ground of Central American social, political 
and economic orders, and as generating what Castellanos Moya terms “national deformation” 
(Castellanos Moya 1993, 30-31).4 The 1980-92 civil war would then be a symptom of a deeper 
underlying tendency, the transformation of which would entail far more than a UN-brokered 
détente. 
 The culture of war thematized by Castellanos Moya seems to return or flare up 
repeatedly over the course of the region’s post-independence history. This peculiar condition of 
dislocation, in which Central America is forever becoming different from itself, is what imparts 
particular urgency to the notion of retorno in the novel I am discussing. At the same time, 
Castellanos Moya’s reflections on El Salvador now appear uncannily prescient in view of more 
recent trends in our world today, in which global conflict presents problems for which the 
conceptual tools of political modernity may no longer be able to provide explanatory power.5 
Indeed, even the underlying doubts present in the Recuento de incertidumbres strike the reader 
as optimistic in the context of a global disorder over which the culture of democracy would 
appear to have little influence.  
Ahora, 16 años después, compruebo perplejo que la violencia no sólo se recicló en El 
Salvador, sino que es el nuevo gran problema de otras naciones, que se ha convertido 
en la peste que, junto a la pobreza, mantiene en la postración a buena parte de 
21 
 
Latinoamérica. La realidad se volvió más grosera, sanguinaria; mi trabajo, como el de 
otros colegas escritores de ficción, consiste en tragarla, digerirla, para luego reinventarla 
de acuerdo con las leyes propias de la fabulación literaria. (Castellanos Moya 2008, np)  
 Let us now go back to El sueño del retorno. Aragón’s plans to return to San Salvador are 
delayed when he suffers a severe case of abdominal pain, which he fears stems from his heavy 
drinking. He seeks the help of a homeopathic doctor and fellow Salvadoran exile, don Chente 
Alvarado. After examining him don Chente dismisses Aragón’s fears of cirrhosis and informs 
him that he has a case of acute intestinal inflammation brought about by stress. Don Chente 
administers acupuncture to relieve the symptoms but warns Aragón that, sooner or later, the 
discomfort is bound to return. Aragón’s guts are all knotted up for some reason or other, the 
doctor tells him, and the condition is unlikely to resolve itself so long as the underlying cause 
remains unaddressed.  
 The doctor appeals to human evolutionary history in order to illustrate to Aragón how 
his physical suffering is linked to an unknown psychic conflict. For many millennia, proto-
humans behaved like all other mammals in relieving themselves wherever they happened to 
be. But when obliged to become sedentary and reside in caves during the Ice Age, Homo 
sapiens learned to control its bodily processes and to defecate in a dedicated site away from 
where it lived and slept. In the subsequent history of the human race, every small child has 
reenacted that cultural evolutionary process during its early years, confronting an anxiety-
producing choice: follow the physiological impulses of the sphincter or heed the social 
imperatives laid down by the parents? 
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La angustia y el control de los esfínteres están estrechamente relacionados. Si a un niño 
se le educa con métodos estrictos y se le reprime en ese momento, a lo largo de su vida 
llevará su angustia al esfínter y por lo mismo al colon. Y cuando como adulto tenga que 
tomar una decisión entre dos opciones, sentirá angustia y esa angustia le hará apretar el 
esfínter y tensionar su colon. De ahí viene la colitis nerviosa, un mal que sufre la mayoría 
de seres humanos, aunque no se hayan percatado de ello. (Castellanos Moya 2013, 20) 
Individual development repeats the evolutionary trajectory of the species; ontogeny 
recapitulates phylogeny, as Ernst Haeckel once asserted. The human body according to 
Alvarado is a writing surface on which the cultural history of humanity inscribes itself as 
developmentalist allegory. The distress experienced by the adult member of the species marks 
the return of that anxiety-filled repression to which the toilet-training child once submitted, 
which in turn reenacts in a condensed timeline the archaic collective repression that gave birth 
to the latrine—and, by implication, to technics and civilization. By the same token, when we 
become anxious for one reason or another this emotional disturbance manifests 
symptomatically as a tightening of the colon.  
 Following a session of hypnosis the doctor informs Aragón that the root cause of his 
immediate discomfort is an unresolved conflict lurking in his familial history, and in particular 
concerning his relationship with his now-deceased father, one that don Chente characterizes as 
an “black hole” (97). The doctor does not, however, reveal anything about what Aragón might 
have said while under hypnosis. The mystery becomes a major source of preoccupation for the 
journalist, who begins to suspect that he may have committed some horrific crime in his past. 
In order to achieve a durable cure, the doctor advises, Aragón will need to work through the 
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knot of paternal conflict. As a therapeutic starting point he recommends that Aragón sit down 
and write out his life story in order to provide himself with material for reflection. This 
exchange between doctor and patient frames a question that Aragón repeatedly puts to himself 
and which perhaps has no proper answer: How to begin narrating one’s own life? Where does 
one start recounting what one is and has been to oneself? What is the first memory in which a 
memoire would find its proper beginning? These questions convey one of the meanings of the 
novel’s title: the return to one’s own past, the attempt to decipher what remains mysterious in 
one’s own history as a step in the direction of resolving the archaic conflicts and impasses that 
we reenact in our everyday lives without being aware of what it is that we are really doing 
(Freud 1950).  
 The homeopathic treatment is interrupted, however, when Don Chente must himself 
return to El Salvador to tend to the estate of his recently deceased mother. No sooner does he 
arrive, however, than the doctor mysteriously vanishes. The news of Alvarado’s unexplained 
disappearance leaves Aragón shaken; his fear that don Chente has become the latest victim of 
the infamous Salvadoran death squads is intensified by the prospect that Aragón himself may 
soon be facing a similarly unhappy fate. In the aftermath of the hypnosis sessions, meanwhile, 
the patient begins to experience—in his dreams as well as in his encounters with fellow exiles—
the return of long-buried childhood memories involving political violence: the bombing of the 
house of his nationalist grandfather by the liberal government in the 1940s, the assassination of 
his father during the turmoil that preceded the 1972 golpe de estado, the brutal slayings of his 
cousin and a close friend at the hands of the military during the civil war, but also the fratricidal 
purges enacted by the Salvadoran FMLN. This Proustian juxtaposition of conscious and 
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involuntary memories discloses another way of reading the novel’s title: the long-forgotten 
memories that return without any bidding, as if they were moved by some kind of automaton. 
 In probing his distant past Aragón unearths a knot that will prove to be the core of the 
novel. In his childhood memories resides an enigma that finds its somatic corollary in the 
intestinal knot for which he sought treatment with don Chente. It also resonates in interesting 
ways with de Man’s account of the allegorical referent as sign of pure anteriority. This 
mysterious knot becomes apparent in the context of Aragón’s pursuit of the question of a first 
memory, an axis in relation to which the meaning of specific experiences and recollections 
would become clear. As it turns out, however, this knot cannot be cut and it renders forever 
dubious the idea of an excavation that could finally discern a first memory that would 
constitute the proper origin of the subject. The mysterious mnemonic image discloses a 
technics—a prosthesis and a mechanicity—at the heart of what we take to be most human: the 
memories of childhood. 
 Aragón’s first memory is of an occurrence that happened when he was just three years 
old. Or at least so he had always believed, although subsequent reflection will cast doubt on 
whether or not the memory is properly speaking his own. One day a bomb detonated in the 
house of his maternal grandfather, a nationalist dissident conspiring to overthrow the 
dictatorship of Maximiliano Hernández Martínez. The blast destroyed much of the house and 
sends its inhabitants scurrying for safety. Aragón recalls watching as his grandmother swooped 
him up and whisked him out of the burning house. Significantly, Aragón recalls, it is this same 
grandmother who would subsequently dedicate herself to undermining the image of her son-
in-law (Aragón’s father) in the little boy’s eyes. Thus this memory, whose enigmatic status I am 
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just beginning to describe, also plays an important role in the unresolved conflict with the name 
of the father to which I alluded earlier. 
Que la memoria es cosa poco confiable lo descubrí cuando me puse a divagar cómo 
comenzaría la historia de mi vida si me sentara a escribirla tal como me aconsejó don 
Chente.…Hasta entonces yo estaba seguro de que mi primer recuerdo de infancia, lo 
que más atrás podía remontarme en mi memoria, el punto desde el que tendría que 
comenzar a relatar mi vida, había sido el bombazo que destruyó el frontispicio de la casa 
de mis abuelos maternos en la primera avenida de Comayagüela, un bombazo de 
advertencia detonado en la madrugada por los coroneles que apoyaban al gobierno 
liberal contra el que conspiraban mi abuelo y sus correligionarios nacionalistas. Yo 
tendría entonces unos tres años de edad y mi recuerdo consistía en una imagen precisa: 
el momento en que mi abuela Lena me llevaba en brazos a través del patio penumbroso 
de la casa, entre el polvillo blanduzco que impregnaba el aire y que procedía de la pared 
destruida por la explosión. Esa imagen era a la que recurría hasta con cierto orgullo 
cuando me tocaba explicar cómo la violencia estaba enraizada en el primer momento de 
mi vida, aunque tendría que precisar “de mi vida consciente,” porque la violencia está 
enraizada en el primer momento de la vida de todos y cada uno, por algo se entra a este 
mundo llorando y haciendo gemir de dolor a la madre. (Castellanos Moya 2013, 70) 
 He confesses that he has always taken a perverse secret pride in recounting this 
experience to others. It illustrates an intensity of and intimacy with violence that, if more or less 
taken for granted by Salvadorans, may well strike outsiders as unimaginable. The anecdote 
allegorizes the exceptionality of the subject, the singular uniqueness of its native realm 
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together with what is universal in it, i.e., its unlimited capacity for reflection and perseverance. 
This confession is followed by an important caveat. This allegorical portrait is disingenuous to 
the degree that it equates a primordial and omnipresent violence with what Aragón calls his 
“conscious life.” Violence in this childhood anecdote is already something that happens to a 
subject. The originary violence that the anecdote seeks to convey, meanwhile, would 
necessarily precede the subject and consciousness; it is not properly speaking 
phenomenalizable. If we read this reflection alongside the discussion in Recuento de 
incertidumbres of an underlying “militarism” in Salvadoran society we can understand the 
reference to this other violence—the  violence that precedes “conscious life,” the violence of 
natality—as another allegory, the figuration of a kind of violence to which representation does 
not have direct access. Such violence need not be limited to the chronological time of infancy, 
and perhaps it cannot be plotted on any timeline whatsoever. It is coterminous with the social 
and thus not historical.  
 As he is preparing to sit down and write out his life story Aragón detects something 
peculiar in what now strikes him as an overly-precise childhood memory of an experience 
charged with fear. The specific memory of being carried out of the burning house by his 
grandmother resembles a cinematic image: it is the image of the helpless child as seen by 
someone else.  
Lo cierto es que de pronto, quizás a causa de ese peculiar estado de ánimo en el que 
permanecía, me encontré preguntándome cómo era que esa imagen casi 
cinematográfica se había instalado en mi memoria, habida cuenta de que si yo iba en los 
brazos de mi abuela Lena no era posible que me pudiera ver desde fuera…que si dudaba 
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de la veracidad de mi primer recuerdo no quería imaginar lo que sería bregar con cada 
uno de los eventos a los que me había tocado hacer frente en la vida. (70) 
The first memory, which ought to be synonymous with the birth of the subject in its capacity for 
self-reflection and thus the cornerstone for self-consciousness, turns out to be of dubious 
origin. Hence in the terms just described it is defective: it fails to sustain a clear boundary 
between what belongs to the self and what does not. As a memory that appears to have been 
constructed and imprinted through some unknown process it precisely causes that distinction 
to become unstable, as a crumbling cornerstone would cause the exterior wall of a building to 
buckle. De Man notes that the process whereby allegory produces an external, visible sign to 
represent an internal state turns out to mask a prior exteriority: the inner state (e.g., memory) 
is itself the imprint or representation of an external occurrence. Against a humanism that tries 
desperately to sustain the idea of a human subject that is sovereign with respect to its own 
nature or essence, allegory discloses that there is no originary interiority prior to the advent of 
technics.  
Pero mi mente ya estaba encaminada en la ruta equivocada: al hacer tambalear mi 
primer recuerdo en la vida provoqué que el péndulo me llevara a una enorme velocidad 
de la placidez anterior al desasosiego, porque la memoria del bombazo no estaba 
encapsulada fuera del tiempo, sino que apuntalaba importantes imágenes de mí mismo 
que ahora empezaban a trastabillar, como aquella en que yo era un niño que lloraba de 
miedo cada vez que oía una sirena, ya fuera de la policía o de los bomberos o de una 
ambulancia… (71-72)  
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 This swing from the contentedness of self-reflection to unease is due not to the content 
of the memory but to the uncertainty surrounding the provenance of this first memory image, 
which might well have been implanted by the grandmother but which also bears the 
unmistakable imprint of the technologies of mass culture. This originary memory makes up just 
one frame in a larger reel or feed of mnemonic images, the velocity of which indicates that they 
are moved by something more machine-like than the will of a subject. This mnemonic 
mechanicity reproduces the disorienting effects of the recollected experience, and we are left 
with the image of a child who, at the mere sounding of a siren, finds himself transported back 
to the scene of the crime and responds by breaking into a howl. But if there is a traumatic site 
in El sueño del retorno this image of the shell-shocked child is not it. On the contrary, this image 
is part of a memory-scape that has been constructed by an adult. Perverse in its enjoyment of 
violence though it may be, this image is the very allegorical foundation of the subject. The 
image of the child’s anguished crying have always been understood as signs referring back to an 
anterior sign. The connection between the primordial memory of the bombing and later 
memories of growing up in El Salvador resides in the formal, acoustic resemblance that the 
sirens bear to the sound of the child’s wailing: the aullido/llanto couplet. The child hears in the 
siren an echo of its own long-extinguished cries.  
Things get complicated and begin to come unraveled, however, when Aragón tries to 
reconstruct the connecting thread through which these memory images have been conjoined 
and rendered meaningful for him.  
Entonces descubrí con sorpresa que yo no tenía ningún recuerdo de esas sirenas 
acercándose a la casa de mis abuelos inmediatamente después del bombazo y las cuales 
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me habían causado el trauma mencionado, por más que en la terraza de La Veiga 
cerraba los ojos para intentar recordar el aullido de esas sirenas que me produjeron 
espanto en la niñez, en mi memoria auditiva no había nada de nada, tan sólo el silencio, 
lo que me llevó a preguntarme de dónde había sacado yo la idea de que mi llanto de 
infancia procedía de ese bombazo, en caso de que fuera realmente mi idea, y si no se 
trataría más bien de otra de las cosas que mi abuela Lena me había metido en la cabeza 
y que yo había convertido en memoria…. (72-73) 
In the archaic memory under examination here Aragón finds no acoustic image of sirens. Is this 
because the child’s memory of those first sirens was somehow effaced or recoded as something 
else? Or did the three-year old in fact never hear any sirens, and thus a memory trace never 
imprinted to begin with? Of course one cannot know the answer to this question, and the 
important point here is that memory turns out to have been constructed on the basis of an 
empty link, a silence whose truth—forgotten, issued but not registered, or simply never present 
to begin with—cannot be filled in.  
 The dream of returning that forms the title of Castellanos Moya’s novel is thwarted at 
the geopolitical level. Aragón, it seems, cannot go back to the country he left, not because the 
risk is too great but because that place no longer exists. He has become part of the relentless 
flow of displacement and migration that defines Salvadoran and Central American history.6  
Deferred indefinitely at the level of geopolitical space, the movement of return takes up again 
at the level of remembrance, both voluntary (Aragón sitting down to write out his life story) 
and involuntary (the myriad of memories that seem to be triggered not by conscious effort but 
by circumstance: serendipitous encounters with old friends, words that unexpectedly remind 
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him of something long forgotten, etc.). At the level of the subject, language, and history there is 
similarly an irreducible element of uncertainty, as the mnemonic foundation of self-
consciousness turns out to be contaminated by a non-natural externality that ruins any 
possibility of determining what belongs properly to the autobiographical self and what does 
not.  Akin to the Faktum discussed by Derrida in his commentary on Rousseau’s Contract, 
remembrance in Castellanos Moya uncovers the traces of a non-natural, non-historical excess 
at the heart of the subject, a technological artifact over which self-consciousness and will have 
no control.  The anecdote through which this Faktum surfaces supports at least two ways of 
understanding its import. On one hand it points to the thought of an originary violence—a 
“militarism” in the words of Recuento de incertidumbres—underlying the social, a violence over 
which politic concepts of hegemony and sovereignty hold no sway. Insofar as political discourse 
claims to contain violence, as it has always done from Hobbes through neoliberal Consensus, it 
necessarily constitutes itself as the repression of this strife, a containment whose failure 
Castellanos Moya’s work seeks to record. On the other hand, this artifact also pertains to 
memory and language, and in that respect it calls attention to ineffaceable and unreadable 
traces of alterity at the heart of what we call the self or the subject. It marks the origin not as 
the purity of a proper space but as an opening to what will later become its outside, an opening 
to others prior to any possibility of distinguishing between self and other.  
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